Department of Commercial Law by Editors,
NECESSITY FOR NOTICE UPON THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW.
ZDlTOR%-IN-CHIEF,
FRANK P. PRICHEARD), Es2.,
Assisted by
H. GORDON McCoucH, CHARLES C. BINNEY,
CHARLES C. TOWNSEND, FRANcIs H. BOHLZN,
OLIVER BoYcS JUDSON.
ROBINSON v. FLOYD ET AL. SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Partners of a banking firm who sell their interest and withdraw from
the firm cannot by a mere publication of notice of such withdrawal in a
newspaper, relieve themselves from liability for subsequent deposits by
one who was a regular depositor for many years prior to such withdrawal;
but a partner who gave actual personal notice to such depositor of his
withdrawal, within three months thereafter, is not liable for such subse-
-quent indebtedness.
NECESSITY FOR NOTICE UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF A PART-
NERSHIP.
When a number of persons join themselves together for the
purpose of carrying on any business or undertaking any kind
of enterprise, each one thereby delegates to the other an
authority, express or implied, to bind the members composing
the partnership by an act or contract coming within the scope
of the business for which the firm might be formed. Instances
sometimes, if not frequently, occur where the authority of one
member of a firm to bind the others will continue after the
actual dissolution of the firm as between the parties them-
.selves. But as to third persons and those dealing with the
firm as creditors, the same continues to exist for all purposes
until- notice of the dissolution, actual or constructive, as the
case may require, is given thereof. This wholesome rule
of the law is founded on the soundest reason, and fortified
.by simple and natural justice. It is akin to the rule that
holds the master liable for goods purchased by his servant
I Reported in 28 Ati. Rep. 258.
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whom he sends to make purchases in the master's name,
and where the servant, though his authority to make the
purchases be withdrawn by the master, continues to buy
of the dealer as before, the master not notifying the dealer
that the servant's authority to buy goods on his credit is at an
end. In short, the authority of the servant in the eye of the
law is presumed to continue until notice to the contrary is
given by the master. The rule is likewise grounded on the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, as "where one party has by his
representations or his conduct, induced the other party to a*
transaction to give him an advantage which it would be
igainst equity and good conscience for him to assert, he would
not in a court of justice be permitted to avail himself of that
advantage." The servant is the agent of the master to buy
goods on his credit. Good faith and fair dealing require the
master to notify his dealer when that relation is ended. And
so one partner is the agent of the others to bind them in all
legitimate firm transactions; and when that authority is ended
by the private agreement of the partners themselves, creditors
of the firm and the public generally have a right to expect
that the proper notice of the dissolution will be given and rely
on this with assurance. Any other rule would open wide the
flood-gates of fraud and facilitate all sorts of dishonesty and
imposition.
There are two kinds of notice usually given when a firm
retires from business and is succeeded by another, or is
dissolved by the withdrawal of one or more of its members.
To the public in general, it is usually sufficient to relieve the
retiring member from liability for debts cointr~cted in the name
of the firm by the remaining partner or partners if notice of
the dissolution be published in some newspaper in the town,
vicinity or county where the business was carried on: Graves
v. Gilbert, 7 Cow. 704; Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 304;
Ketchum v. Clark, 6 Johns. 144; Wilkinson v. Bank of Pa.,
4 Whart. (Pa.) 482; Reilly v. Smith, 16 La. An. 31; Wheelock
v. McGovern, 28 Iowa, 533; Simonds v. Strong, 24 Vt. 642;
Mitchum v. Bank of Ky., 9 Dana, 166; Kennedy v. Bohannon,
. I B. Mon. (Ky.) I18; Graves v. Merry, 6 Cow. 701; Austin
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v. Holland, 57 N. Y. 571; Amidown v. Osgood, 24 Vt. 278;
Haynes v. Carter, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 7; Bristol v. Sprague,
8 Wend. 423; Johnson v.Tolten, 3 Cal. 343; Meyer v. Khron,
114 Ill. 574; Moline Wagon Co.v. Rummel, 12 Fed. Rep. 658.
On the other hand, all who have had dealings with the firm
prior to the dissolution are entitled to actual notice: McLemore
v. Rankin Mfg. Co., 8 So. Rep. 845; Clement v. Clement,
69 Wis. 599; Morrill v. Bissell, 58 N. W. Rep. 324; Hall v.
Heck, 92 Mich. 458; Moline Wagon Co. v. Rummel, 12 Fed.
Rep. 658; Meyer v. Khron, 114 Ill. 574; Shamburg v.
Abbott, 112 Pa. 6; Cogswell v. Davis, 65 Wis. 191 ; Gilchrist
v. Brand, 58 Wis. 184; Elkington v. Booth, 143 Mass. 479;
Potts v. Taylor, 14o Pa. 6oi; Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio, 598;
Wilkinson v. Bank of Pa., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 482; Reilly v.
Smith, 16 La. An. 31; Simonds v. Strong, 24 Vt. 642;
Mitchum v. Bank of Ky., 9 Dana (Ky.), 166; Kennedy v.
Bohannon, II B. Mon. (Ky.) I 18; Marsh, Denman & Co. v.
Dosson, ig La. An. 9; Pope & West v. Risley, 23 Mo. 185;
Lyon v. Johnson,-28 Conn. I; Merrett v.Williams, 17 Kan. 287;
Stewart v. Sonnebarn, 49 Ala. 178; Zollar v. Jarvin, 47 N. H.
324; Graves v. Merry, 6 Cowen (N. Y.), 7oi; Clapp v.
Rogers, 12 N. Y. 283; Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co.,
12 Barb. 27; Wardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb. 549; Vernon v.
Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. 183; Prentiss v. Sinclair, 5 Vt. 149;
Adam v. Holtgrove, 85 Ill. 470; Dickinson v. Dickinson,
25 Gratt. 321; Austin v. Holland, 57 N.Y. 571; Nott v.
Douming, 6 La. 68o; Haynes v. Carter, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 7;
Johnson v.Tolten, 3 Cal. 343; Brown v. Foster, 19 S. E. Rep.
299; Robinson v. Floyd, 28 Atl. Rep. 258; Rosenbaum v.
Horton, 57 N. W. Rep. 6o9; Bristol v. Sprague, 8 Wend. 423.
The retiring partner is charged with notice of the fact that
the remaining partners can bind him by contracts made in the
.name of the old firm, and it is his duty under the law to dili-
.gently search out all the old customers of the firm at his peril,
.and to see that they -have 'actual notice of the dissolution:
Amidown v. Osgood, 24 Vt. 278. And this is necessary
whether the name of the retiring partner appear in the style of
the firm or not: McLemore v. Rankin Mfg. Co., 68 Miss. 196.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana lays down the recognized
rule very correctly as follows: "The general rule of law is
that, as to persons who have not dealt with the firm, notice in
a public newspaper of the city or county where the partner-
ship business is carried on will be sufficient; but as to persons
who have been previously in the habit of dealing with the firm
it is requisite that actual notice should be brought home to
the creditor, or, at least, that the credit should be given under
circumstances from which actual notice may be inferred:"
Reilly v. Smith, i6 La. An. 3'.
It may be necessary to inquire sometimes 'what is sufficient
rnotice. The case of Haynes v. Carter, 12 Heisk. 7 was an
action to charge one W. L. Carter, Sr., with a debt contracted
in the name of a firm of which he had been a member, and
which was made after his withdrawal. The creditors seeking
to charge him had been previous dealers with the firm,
the style of which was Carter & Upton. In the course
of events, the senior Carter, who seems to have been the
responsible m6mber of the firm, withdrew and was succeeded
by his son, W. L. Carter, Jr. The style of the firm was not
changed. The dissolution was advertised in a local news-
paper, a copy of which, containing the notice marked in red
ink, was sent to the creditors by Carter, Jr. It was shown
that this notice was not received, and it was held that Carter,
Sr., was liable. It was held, further, that the sending of the
paper was evidence tending to show notice, but was not, of
itself, sufficient when it was shown that it was not received.
It was also held that the sending a notice of dissolution
properly directed would raise a presumption of notice, as
letters sent by post are presumed to reach their destination;
but that is a presumption of fact only, and not of law, and
might be repelled by proof. Nor is it notice to a previous
dealer that he take the paper in which the notice is contained
unless he see it, or actual knowledge of it be brought home to
him: Lyon v. Johnson, 28 Conn. I. The law does not require
that every notice or advertisement contained in a newspaper be
read; and even if a creditor take a paper in which a notice of
,dissolution is contained, and actually receive the very number
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containing the same, this will not be notice. It is probable,
and perhaps nothing is more common, than for persons to
take newspapers without reading every advertisement they
contain, and it would be going entirely beyond the pale of
reason to visit a person with the knowledge of the contents of
all notices contained in a paper from day to day: Wilkinson
v. Bank of Pa., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 482; Austin v. Holland,
69 N. Y. 571; Reilly v. Smith, I6 La. An. 3I; Meyer v-
Khron, I 14 Ill. 574. And a letter stating the dissolution,
which was not returned from the dead letter office, though
properly mailed and directed, is not sufficient notice without
other evidence of its receipt. The rule that letters properly
addressed and mailed are evidence of notice is restricted to.
commercial paper, and does not apply in case of the dissolu-
tion of a partnership: Kenney v. Altvater, 77 Pa. St. 34.
It is not necessary, however, that the creditor have actual
notice of the dissolution of a copartnership. He may have a
knowledge of such facts and circumstances as are inconsistent
with anything les§ than notice. Or, if we have information of
facts, which if diligently followed up with inquiry, would lead
to a knowledge of the fact of dissolution, he shall be deemed_
in law to have actual knowledge of it. He cannot be wilfully
blind when facts that imply the necessary information are
brought to his knowledge. The law requires the retiring-
partner to give the necessary notice; none the less, however,
does it require the creditor to use proper diligence and the
means of information when he has that means: Prentiss v.
Sinclair, 5 Vt. 149 ; Pope v. Risely, 23 Mo. 185 ; Stewart v.
Sonnebarn, 49 Ala. 178; Rimel v. Hays, 83 Mo. 200; John-
son v. Tolten, 3 Cal. 343.
But it is not every kind of information that a creditor is
bound to pursue in order to hold the retiring partner; for
instance, every one is charged with knowledge of the contents
of the public records of the courts, the records of deeds and
mortgages, etc., but the recording of a mortgage executed by
the remaining member of the firm to the retiring partner,
is not notice to the world nor to the creditor that there has
been a dissolution, and this though the property embraced ir
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-the mortgage be goods like those of the firm, and actual
knowledge of the existence of such a mortgage be brought
home to the creditor, does not charge him with notice, nor, as
matter of law, put him upon inquiry. The fact that the credi-
tor may have had the means of knowledge which, if followed
up diligently, would have revealed the dissolution, yet this will
not charge him unless the circumstances were such as to put him
upon inquiry. If any question should arise involving the title
-to the property mortgaged, the mortgage being properly regis-
tered, would be constructive and conclusive notice to purchasers
because it would be their duty to look to the registry for con-
veyances affecting the property. No such duty, however, rests
upon a creditor of a firm to learn of the dissolution thereof.
The law does not require that the retirement of a partner
:should be matter of record where deeds and mortgages should
be registered, and of course there can be no requirement that
a creditor look for a record to ascertain of a dissolution. It
-must be the duty of the creditor to follow up the knowledge
that puts him upon inquiry before he can be charged with
;knowledge of what a due inquiry would lead up to: Zollar v.
Jarvin, 47 N. H. 324.
If the creditor have notice of the dissolution, whether directly
from the retiring partner or from-third persons or from having
seen the same advertised, or if he have the information from
-any source or in any mode whatsoever. It is sufficient if he
have it. When this is the case all is accomplished that could
.be effected by serving actual notice upon him, or by the most
diligent advertising, and this is true, though the retiring partner
be negligent in not giving notice, yet the creditor cannot pursue
.him and hold him for the debts of the firm contracted subse-
quently to the change: Dickinson v. Dickinson, 25 Gratt, 321;
Austin v. Holland, 69 N. Y. 371; Laird v. Ivens, 45 Tex.
622; Holtgrieve v.,. Wintker, 85 Ill. 472; Young v. Tibbets,
32 Wis. 79; Haynes v. Carter, 12 Heisk. 7; Davis v. Keys,
38 N. Y. 94; Johnson v. Tolten, 3 Cal. 343. The" creditor
must have this knowledge before he extends the credit in order
to hold the outgoing member. If he credits the firm before
learning this and have used due diligence on his part to ascer-
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tain the fact of dissolution, though he may afterwards come to-
a knowledge of the dissolution, however effective and convinc-.
ing this knowledge be, he is still entitled to look to the retiring
partner for his debt. His right to so hold him will not depend
on the knowledge he may have of the retirement at the time
his debt falls due or at the time he brings his action thereon,
but will depend on his knowledge or ignorance of the disso
lution at the time of entering into the contract and extending
the credit: Wilkinson v. Bank of Pa., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 482. In
a case where a firm was composed of three brothers named
Wortendyke, and the style was Wortendyke & Co., one of'
the brothers retired selling his interest to one H. The firm
name was changed to Wortendyke Bros. & Co. No notice of'
dissolution was given, and it was held that this change in the
firm was not sufficient to put creditors upon inquiry, but that
they had the right to presume that all the Wortendyke
Brothers were members until notice was given to the contrary :
American Linen. Thread Co. v. Wortendyke, 24 N. Y. 550.
But, doubtless, if upon the retirement of a partner the name of'
the firm so changes as to be sufficient to put dealers upon
inquiry, the case would be different. For instance, if A- and
B dissolve partnership, A selling out to B, and the latter form-
ing a partnership with C, under the style of C & Co., this
would certainly put a former creditor of A and B upon inquiry,
that is, of course, if the subsequent transactions be in the name
of C & Co.
The rule requiring notice of dissolution to be given applies
not only to partners de facto but eo nomine as well. And
where one holds himself out to the public or to creditors as a
partner, he is, of course, bound for the firm debts contracted in
the usual course of business just as though he were a partner
to all intents and purposes. And if such ostensible partner
withdraws from the firm or ceases to hold himself out to the
world as a partner, it is incumbent on him to give notice of the
fact, just -as a partner de facto must. This rule is grounded
upon the principle of estoppel which will not allow one to hold
himself out to the public as a partner in a firm, and upon being
sued on debts contracted by the firm upon the faith of his sol-
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vency, say that he was not a partner. For the courts to hold
otherwise would be to encourage dishonesty: Walrath v.
Viley, 2 Bush. (Ky.) 478; Riser v. James, 26 Kan. 221;
Carmichael v. Greer, 55 Ga. 116; Warren v. Ball, 37 Ill. 76 ;
Brown v. Grant, 39 Minn. 404; Maxwell v. Gibbs, 32 Iowa
.32; Campbell v. Hastings, 29 Ark. 512; Brugman v. Mc-
Guire, 32 Ark. 733 ; Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio, 598 ; Humes
v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64.
It is not necessary that the party hold himself out as a
partner in any particular manner. It may be done by word,
act, or deed as well as by conduct. In fact if he does, or omits to
do, any thing or act which in any way causes the belief that he
is a partner,. he will not be heard to say he is not when it is
sought to charge him as such: Cirkel v. Croswell, 36 Minn. 323-
And if a person even suffer himself to be held out as a partner,
he will be liable unless he give notice.
This doctrine of estoppel is well illustrated in the case of
Riser v. James, supra. It seems that R. 0. Riser & Co. were
a firm of bankers, the firm being composed of Riser and one
Moses Waters. The latter retired without giving notice
thereof. He was sued on an indebtedness contracted by the
remaining partner in the name of the firm, and sought to
screen himself from liability under the plea that there was no
proof of any partnership, and that no notice was necessary.
There had been published in a local newspaper an advertise-
ment of the banking firm in which the name of Moses
appeared as one of the partners. He had put money into.
the enterprise, and it was notoriously and generally known in
the community that he had been a partner" in the business.
The firm name was not changed. It was also shown that the
letter-heads used by the bank contained the names of both
Moses and Riser as members. These letter-heads were used
after the dissolution, Riser even writing to Moses on them.
These facts being shown, it was held sufficient to establish the
fact that Moses either held himself out as a partner, or suffered
himself to be so held out, and that he. should have given
notice. The usual mode of giving notice of the dissolution of
a firm to new customers is by notice published in some news-
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paper in the town, city, or vicinity where the business is car-
ried on: Kennedy v. Altwater, 77 Pa. 34. And the notice
should be published in some paper where advertisements are
usually published: Simonds v. Strong, 24 Vt. 642. The dis-
solution will not be effectual as to third persons until the notice
required by law. is given, though it be ever so effective as
between the partners themselves: Johnson v. Tolten, 3 Cal.
343. The manner of giving notice is important where a
question of notice or the sufficiency thereof is disputed. If
there be a newspaper published in the place where the busi-
ness is, it is necessary for the retiring partner-at least for
some of the partners-to give notice of the dissolution by
adverfisement therein: Mitchum v. Bank of Ky. 9 Dana (Ky.)
166; Simonds v. Strong, 24 Vt. 642. And the mere noto-
riety of the dissolution at the place of business of the firm will
not protect a retiring partner unless that fact be also known to
the creditor extending credit to the firm : Martin v. Searles,
28 Conn. 43; Brown v. Foster, ig S. E. Rep. 299; Pitcher v.
Barrows, -17 Pick. (Mass.) 35 1. The notice must be reason-
able; it need not be in a newspaper necessarily, but may be in
some other public and notorious manner. But whether by
publication in a newspaper or not, it must, so far as strangers
and third parties are concerned, be so public and notorious
as to put the public on its guard: Wardwell v. Haight,
2 Barb. 549.
The fact that the dissolution is notorious and matter of
common knowledge throughout the community is always
competent evidence tending to establish knowledge on the
part of the creditor of the dissolution: Lovejoy v. Spafford,
93 V. S. 430. But mere notoriety or general reputation in
the vicinity where the firm conducts its business will not
charge a dealer with knowledge of the notorious facts unless
the circumstances are such that he ought to take notice of the
same. And a notice of dissolution which is tacked up in
several public places in a town where the business is carried
on, is hot sufficient notice to a distant creditor who would not
be apt to know what may or may not be notorious in some
certain community, and he could hold the retiring partner for
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his debt; and this will be the case, though the creditor does not
live at a great distance, but only a few miles off: Mitchum
-V. Bank of Ky., 9 Dana (Ky.), 166. And a notice purposely
placed in a newspaper at a distance, and remote from the
place of business, which did not -have a circulation in the
-vicinity of the business, would, of course, be inadequate even
as to new dealers. Such an attempt to avoid the liability
incident to a withdrawal without notice would carry with it
-the very ear-marks of fraud. The law requires good faith in
the matter of giving notice, and when this is lacking the pro-
tection those who are diligent in giving notice are entitled to
will be withheld where there is a manifest lack of good faith
in giving notice of retirement.
In order to affect a community with knowledge of a disso-
lution of a partnership, "the evidence of a dissolution should
be clear, distinct and unambiguous, and the notice of it be by
'means sufficient to give it :" Brown v. Clark, 14 Pa. 469.
It should be borne.in mind that this rule charging creditors
of the dissolution when the fact is notorious in the community.,
.applies only to new dealers; at least to dealers who live in the
same town or city, and the circumstances are such that the
law would presume them to be cognizant of the fact. But in
the case of a firm dealing with a very distant creditor, the
transactions between debtor and creditor being to a great
extent, and perhaps exclusively through written orders, the
law under such circumstances does not require such distant
creditor to take notice of every fact of local notoriety in a dis-
tant community, such creditor being a previous dealer. Any
other rule would be in the teeth of the decigions which accord
to old dealers the right to actual notice: Scheifflin v. Stephens,
I Winst. Law, Io6.
Mere notoriety or general reputation in a community is not
-enough to prove the existence of a partnership, unless the
circumstances are such as to estop the party to be charged
from denying the relation. The very foundation of the. rule
requiring notice of withdrawal to be given is, that the party to
be charged for a want of sucli notice would have been liable if
he had not withdrawn: Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64. On
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the other hand, it will not be a defense to be availed of by the
outgoing partner, that the creditor, who extended indulgence
to the firm, was ignorant of the fact-that such partner was, at
the time of the entering into of the contract, a member of the
firm. The law presumes that the dealer extends credit to
every member of the firm, though he does not really know-
every person composing it. This principle is based on the
rule that all who are generally known by the public as.
partners, and who, in fact, are such, are liable, and, upon
retiring, must give the requisite notice: Kennedy v. Bohanno,
II B. Mon. (Ky.) 188; Clapp v. Rogers, 12 N.Y. 28 3 . And
this is the case, though the party sought to be charged be
really the responsible member of the firm, and the dealer when
extending the credit did not knbw this : Elkington v. Booth,
143 Mass. 479. Neither is it any defense in behalf of the retir-
ing. partner that, for any reason, he did not have time to give-
the notice. He is held to undertake the partnership agree-.
ment with notice of the exactions the laly makes, and these he
must comply with at his peril, though it may be impossible to
do so in some cases: Martin v. Searles, 28 Conn. 43; Bristol
v. Sprague, 8 Wend. 423.
But a person who is not a partner in a firm, though he hold
himself out to the world as such, is not liable on a contract
made in the name of the firm, if the credit was extended
without the knowledge that he held himself out as a partner,
and in such a case it will not be necessary to give notice of
dissolution so far as such partner is concerned: Thompson v.
First Nati. Bank of Toledo, I I I U. S. 529. In such cases
the doctrine of estoppel does not obtain, as the dealer has not
been misled. The law does not presume that credit is
extended to the nominal partner unless he be known as such.
It is not sufficient for the retiring partner to give notice of
the dissolution. to the agent of the dealer; at least unless it
be shown that the scope of the agency be such as to embrace--
authority to receive notice. It should in any event be shown
that the agent has general authority before the principal can
, be held to his knowledge in the matter of such notice. And
the burden of showing the authority of the agent to receive
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the notice is on the party alleging he has that authority:
Stewart v. Sonnebarn, 49 Ala. 178; Brown v. Foster, 19 S. E.
Rep. 299. And this is the rule whether the creditor be an
old or a new one: Id. And notice to a director of a corpora-
tion is not sufficient notice to the corporation itself. The
notice should be given to some principal or managing officer,
as the cashier or president: Bank v. Norton, I Hill (N.Y.), 572.
But in case of the necessity of giving notice to a firm it is
not necessary to give notice to any particular member of it,
nor is it necessary that all have notice. If the notice be given
to any member it will suffice, and this is true though credit
may be extended to the old firm by other members who are
ignorant of the notice, and upon the faith in the solvency of
the retiring member: Gaar v. Huggins, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 259.
The distinction in case of a corporation and a firm. In the
latter, any one partner has authority to bind all the other
members in any firm transaction, and the firm is consequently
charged with notice if it be brought home to any of the
members. But as a corporation can only act through its
board of directors and officers regularly constituted by such
board, and to the extent only of the real or apparent authority
of such board or officers, and a mere director having no
authority to bind the corporation in any manner whatever,
cannot, of course, bind it with his knowledge of the dissolu-
tion of a partnership. Who is, and who is not, a dealer within
the sense and meaning of the rule, may in some cases be a
questior of more or less difficulty. It seems to be laid down
that a single cash transaction, or, perhaps, any number of
such transactions, will not constitute a pers6n a previous
dealer so as to entitle him to actual notice of the dissolution:
Merrett v. Williams, 17 Kan. 287. A previous dealer is
obviously one who has extended credit to the firm before the
dissolution; who has had dealings such as to build up a credit
upon the faith of the partnership. Cash transactions do not
require that conservative and scrutinizing inquiry into the
standing and names of the members of a partnership that is
necessary and prudent in making sales on a credit. In a
credit transaction, the dealer wants to know whom he is
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trusting; in cash transactions it is not material, as he runs
no risk in -selling to any one on a cash basis. Doubtless, the
number of credit transactions necessary to bring a creditor
within the rule as a previous dealer is not'especially material.
It is enough if the creditor have extended credit on the faith
of the firm and the financial responsibility of its members, and
it has been held that two transactions are sufficient for all
purposes: Wardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb. 549. And when a
credit is once raised on the faith of a copartnership, -the dealer
has the right to presume that the partnership continues the
same until he has notice to the contrary: Id.
But one who comes into the possession of paper of a firm
through a mere casual transaction, is not, in the eye of the
law, a previous dealer and is not entitled to actual notice:
Hutchinson v. Bank of Tenn., 8 Hump. 418.
But the rule is different if he be in the habit of discounting
the bills of the old firm. In cases of this kind it is presumed
that he deals in the paper on the strength of his faith in the
solvency of all the partners, and he is, for all purposes of
notice, a previous dealer. And a creditor who has been in
the habit of taking notes of the firm in payment of sundry
transactions is likewise entitled to actual notice: Graves v. Gil-
bert, 7 Cow. 70i. Again, where a note made by the firm had
been discounted by a bank for the accommodation of the
payee, and repeatedly renewed, it is necessary that actual
notice be given, as this would make the bank a previous
dealer. But only those who are in the habit of taking the
paper of the firm under circumstances where the knowledge
of the fact on the part of the firm itself might be legally pre-
sumed will be entitled to actual notice: Vernon v. The Man-
hattan Co., 22 Wend. 183; Vernon v. The Manhattan Co.,
17 Id. 527; Brown v. Clark, 14 Pa. 469; Mechanics'
Bank v. Livingston, 33 Barb. 458; Janson v.. Grimshaw,
26 Ill. App. 287; Nott v. Downing, 6 La. 68o; Clement v.
Clement, 69 Wis. 599.
When a partner retires, his authority to execute notes in
* the name of the old firm, even for the pre-existing indebted-
ness of the partnership, ceases. But all the partners will be
,6
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liable on such paper executed by any one of them after the-
dissolution, to old or new dealers, as the case may be, until
actual or constructive notice, as the circumstances may call:
for, be given: Davis v. Willis. The power of the remaining:
partners, after the withdrawal of a member, exist until notice-
thereof be given as required by law. And this authority-
extends, not only to making ordinary purchases in the name
of the old firm, but likewise to the executing and negotiating
of bills payable, and commercial paper generally, with the scope
of the business for which the partnership was formed. And
so far as the public and prior dealers are concerned, the part-.
neiship exists, for all purposes, until the necessary notice of
dissolution is given: Amidown v. Osgood, 24 Vt. 278.
As to dormant partners, however, a very different rule-
obtains. And where a dormant partner is not known to be-
such by the dealer when his transactions with the firm are con-
summated, it is not incumbent on him to give any notice on his
withdrawal from the firm, and his failure or neglect to give-
any kind of notice whatever will not make him liable: Nus-
shaumer v. Becker, 87 Ill. 281 ; I Ewel's Lim'd. Part. (2d Am.-
Ed.) star p. 213; Rand. Com. Paper, § 427; Wood's Byles
on Bills, star p. 51 and notes; Id. p. lo6; Daniel Leg. Inst.
Sec. 353; Id. Sec. 369 a. The foundation of the rule is, the-
dormant partndr is not known either to the creditor or to the
public as such. He is not intrusted when the firm is credited,.
and in the event he fails to give notice, the creditor can show-
no injury thereby. The creditor would never have presented
his bill to this partner. He was not credited, and he made no.
contract; because it is familiar elementary hw that the minds
must meet before a contract is effectually made. He does not-
act the role of a partner. There is nothing to make him such.
in fact, so far as the outside world is concerned. So, where a
firm is composed of two persons, one of whom is dormant, and,
whose name does not appear in the style of the firm, and a
creditor takes a note for the firm debt which is signed by both
the dormant and known partner, but the relation of the dor-
mant partner is not disclosed, he will only occupy the relation
to the creditor of a surety, guarantor or indorser, as the case
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may be, for this particular transaction, but this will not make
him liable for the subsequent debts of the firm, although other
persons might know of the dormant partner having an interest
in the business: Cregler v. Durham, 9 Ind. 375. But if the
dormant.partner is made known to the creditor by the other
partner for the purpose of obtaining credit, and though this
making known be without his knowledge or consent, he will
be liable for debts contracted under such state of things, and
it will be necessary for him to give notice upon retiring from
the firm, at least, to sudh as may have extended the firm credit
on the faith of the information; nor does it matter from what
source the creditor obtains this knowledge, if he really knows
it and relys on it in his transactions with the firm: Milmo Natl.
Bank v. Carter, 2o S. W. Rep. 836 ; Kennedy v. Bohannon, I I
B. Mon. (Ky.) I 18. And the dormant partner will be bound
if the creditor only believe him to be a partner, unless he give
notice upon withdrawing: Leib v. Craddock, 87 Ky. 525.
But the authorities do not carry the doctrine any further than
this in holding a dormant partner liable; and it would cer-
tainly be stepping over the recognized line to do so.
On principle, it is always necessary to show in an action to
charge a retiring partner with the debts of the firm, contracted
after the dissolution, that he would be liable, as a partner, had
the dissolution not taken place. This done and a prima fade
case being made out against him, the onus shifts upon him to
show that he gave the requisite notice. If it be denied that
he ever sustained such a relation to the firm as would charge
him as a partner, this would resolve itself into a question of
fact to be determined by a jury under proper instructions from
the court. The burden would be on the creditor in the first
place, to show that the party to be charged was once a partner,
or that his relation to the firm, or holding himself out, was
such as to imply that he was a member, and that the credit
was extended, relying in whole or in part on this state of facts,
this would make it incumbent on him to disprove these facts,
or that he had, upon retirement, given the necessary notice of
dissolution. W. C. RODGERS.
Nashville, Ark.
